Talk:Hamas

Lede

@Hemiauchenia: Lede is a summary of the body; readers do not expect to read every single country that has designated Hamas as a terrorist organization as much as they do not expect to see every single country that does not see it as such. The burden of achieving consensus lies on yourself as the inserter of these details. [1] Makeandtoss (talk) 12:45, 20 October 2024 (UTC)

This has been the stable compromise consensus for months in this page without objection, check the page history. People have inevitably quibbled about how Hamas's designation as a terrorist organisation should be characterised, from "many countries" to "a few Western countries", and just listing them seems to have provoked the least objection. It's not all the countries either, as Paraguay is not listed due to lack of significance. Hemiauchenia (talk) 15:42, 20 October 2024 (UTC)

One version of the Western World

Just saying "western" can be misleading as not everyone would agree that Japan, Israel and Paraguay belong to the "West". Alaexis_¿question? 22:19, 20 October 2024 (UTC)

Then obviously the correct phrasing would be "a number of western countries". Consensus can be challenged and developed. I see no reason why we list the pro-terrorism label countries and not the ones opposing it. NPOV should be restored. Makeandtoss (talk) 13:59, 21 October 2024 (UTC)

What countries oppose it? Not designating Hamas as terrorists is not the same as opposing such designation. Also, there are also non-Western countries that designated it as a terrorist organisation. Alaexis_¿question? 20:30, 21 October 2024 (UTC)

58 countries in the United Nations opposed this desgination. So we are clearly giving way more due weight to one side here. Addressing your concerns, I think the best middle ground solution that we came with here is replacing the list with this summary: "a number of western countries". @Alaexis: @Hemiauchenia: Makeandtoss (talk) 07:50, 9 November 2024 (UTC)

2006 source

We cannot state that Hamas accepts Israel in the present tense using Graham Usher's 2006 book. We should either add the year like I've done or remove it altogether (we have a long section dealing with the Hamas' attitude towards Israel). Reverting my addition without providing a valid reason is a violation of policy. Alaexis_¿question? 20:43, 21 October 2024 (UTC)

I agree, @Smallangryplanet: it seems like you're using reverts as too much of a bludgeon, undoing various changes at once without sufficient explanation. Reverts should generally be finer-grained and concerns more clearly articulated. — xDanielx ^T/_C\^R 21:53, 21 October 2024 (UTC)

It was long-standing consensus to not include the 2006 year specification in-page, and I don't see any need for why it has to be included, unless there's some evidence that Usher has changed his analysis or it has been supplanted by recent evidence. None of that has been provided, in fact the page has content that says otherwise.

Moreover, we also haven't added dates to every other reference on the page, and I see no need to do so here either. Raskolnikov.Rev (talk) 22:12, 21 October 2024 (UTC)

Where was this consensus? We don't date attributed statements by default, but Alaexis made what seems like a reasonable point that it might make sense in this particular case since the source predates a very pertinent event. — xDanielx ^T/_C\^R 22:17, 21 October 2024 (UTC)

The Usher reference has been on the page without a date specification since July.

I disagree that it's reasonable to add the date specification in-page when there's no evidence that the author in question has altered their view, and despite pertinent recent events, the claim stated by the author has been confirmed subsequent to that as well, with Hamas leaders again reiterating their "long-term truce" proposals as noted on the page.

But in any case, we have no idea how the author responded to those events, and there's no reason to speculate by adding in-page date citation and thereby suggesting it's outdated now. Raskolnikov.Rev (talk) 22:27, 21 October 2024 (UTC)

WP:AGEMATTERS. Also it's just common sense that something that was written 18 years ago should not be stated in present tense given lots of things that happened since then (Gaza takeover, 2017 document, the current war, etc). Alaexis_¿question? 19:35, 22 October 2024 (UTC)

Yes, and as WP:AGEMATTERS notes, Be sure to check that older sources have not been superseded. You have not presented any evidence that this has been the case. On the contrary, you list an event like the rewrite of the original Hamas charter that further confirms what Usher concluded, and the same is true with respect to the "long-term ceasefire" proposals that are noted on the page and extend throughout that period, including the reiteration of it post-October 7. Raskolnikov.Rev (talk) 19:43, 22 October 2024 (UTC)

@Raskolnikov.Rev you've made 2 reverts in 24 hours. Please revert yourself.

My point is very simple, either you should use past tense for something written in 2006 or you should remove it altogether. I'd prefer the latter but I'm fine with the former as well. Alaexis_¿question? 19:50, 22 October 2024 (UTC)

You're right, I misjudged by a few hours.

Will revert you again shortly unless someone else gets to it first, and ask you to not remove longstanding RS content that's being discussed in Talk and does not have consensus to be removed.

And I once more repeat my position: We do not add dates unless it is necessary, and no reason has been provided for doing so here. Raskolnikov.Rev (talk) 19:54, 22 October 2024 (UTC)

You need to establish consensus to keep this in the article, WP:ONUS is very clear about it The responsibility for achieving consensus for inclusion is on those seeking to include disputed content. We can see in this thread that there is no consensus for keeping this passage as is.

"Will revert you again shortly unless someone else gets to it first" doesn't seem like a proper attitude for building encyclopaedia collaboratively. Alaexis_¿question? 20:01, 22 October 2024 (UTC)

As I have noted before, the RS text has been on the page since July, and you removed it now despite there being opposition to it in Talk.

You need to seek consensus to remove it, and in my view have failed to provide any good reasons for it. Moreover, after first attempting to add a date to it which was reverted by another editor precipitating this discussion, you moved to removing the entire text and source altogether.

I do not believe that this is a proper attitude for building an encyclopedia collaboratively. It's more akin to edit-warring. Raskolnikov.Rev (talk) 20:07, 22 October 2024 (UTC)

We don't add year specifications for many if not all of the other references cited in the text, this is because the date is included in the reference citation itself. Do we know that Usher has changed positions since 2006, or is this speculation? Insisting on including this year seems like an NPOV violation, because the only reason I can think of for including it is to imply that the opinion has changed. As @Raskolnikov.Rev notes, do we have any evidence that Usher's opinion has changed? If not, I don't see any reason to include the year in the text. If it has, we should include that information. Smallangryplanet (talk) 09:35, 23 October 2024 (UTC)

I'm confused. The source cited to Graham Usher appears to have been published in 2020, not 2006.VR _{(Please ping on reply)} 03:32, 25 October 2024 (UTC)

That's the date of when it was published online. Check the issue and volume: "Volume 35, 2006 - Issue 3". Raskolnikov.Rev (talk) 03:35, 25 October 2024 (UTC)

In that case, I'd agree with Alaexis, that yes we should add the year. However, we have more recent sources about Hamas' implicit acceptance of Israel, I'll add them. I'm more concerned about the Martin Kear source. I just checked it and it doesn't seem about recognizing the existence of Israel, rather about whether it sees as a "Israel as a legitimate actor".VR _{(Please ping on reply)} 03:56, 25 October 2024 (UTC)

Disagree about the year citation for reasons mentioned, again we don't do that for the other citations on the page unless there's good reason for it. I'm not sure about the Kear reference, haven't looked into it, but if it's not correct then yes it should be fixed. Raskolnikov.Rev (talk) 04:27, 25 October 2024 (UTC)

I understand where you're coming from. If we did that for every citation, the article would become a huge mess. @Alaexis, do you think some significant evolution happened post-2006 that would lead us to consider this dated? From my understanding, Hamas has moved towards, not away from recognizing Israel since then with its 2017 Charter.VR _{(Please ping on reply)} 04:39, 25 October 2024 (UTC)

Yes, that was the point me and @Smallangryplanet made. Usher's statement was further strengthened by subsequent events like the 2017 Charter and the continued issuance of the "long-term ceasefire" proposals, including post-October 7, and there's no evidence that he changed his views, so conditions to include date-specification aren't met. I believe the main concern was with ensuring NPOV in the section though, but that should be addressed with additional information and sources, which is being done now. Raskolnikov.Rev (talk) 04:50, 25 October 2024 (UTC)

@Vice regent, well, they've made a lot of contradictory statements since then (see Hamas#2017–_6_Oct._2023_(new_charter)) sometimes indicating potential acceptance of the 1967 borders and sometimes saying that they claim everything between the river and the sea but they've been pretty consistent in refusing to formally recognise Israel (example).

The dispute is due to *some* scholars saying that Hamas has implicitly recognised Israel while others consider it a ploy. There are plenty of newer sources dealing with the topic and in any case there is absolutely no reason to use 20-years old sources to describe the current situation. Alaexis_¿question? 22:54, 29 October 2024 (UTC)

@Alaexis The reason for the Usher source is to directly address formal vs informal recognition. That section is specifically about the question of Recognition of Israel in general, so RS that directly address that question, regardless of age, are relevant to include.

The sources are also pretty clear that the 'long term peace' position of Hamas includes informal recognition "as a political reality" from 2006 onwards. (This is further reinforced by later statements.) See the section you linked, those preceding it, and here for additional sources. Smallangryplanet (talk) 10:23, 30 October 2024 (UTC)

@Vice regent I've updated the sourcing for the Kear piece, it was referencing the wrong page - has now been fixed. Thanks for flagging that! Smallangryplanet (talk) 07:05, 25 October 2024 (UTC)

You're right, I misjudged by a few hours. Will revert you again shortly unless someone else gets to it first is pretty akin to edit warring. 1rr is not an allowance. ScottishFinnishRadish (talk) 20:14, 22 October 2024 (UTC)

You're right, it would be best if someone else gets to it as I'm involved. Raskolnikov.Rev (talk) 20:25, 22 October 2024 (UTC)

Recognition of Israel - first sentence

Whether Hamas would recognize Israel is debated is a weird first sentence of the section. Wikipedia is not a WP:CRYSTALBALL. I've requested a source for that the other day and no source was provided but now I think that it shouldn't be in the article at all. Alaexis_¿question? 15:16, 26 October 2024 (UTC)

It is a factual statement - as immediately shown by the contents of the section. I think we would be trying to WP:CRYSTALBALL if we made a specific pronouncement about recognition, since all of the following content in the section shows that it's not quite that cut and dry. Smallangryplanet (talk) 08:45, 27 October 2024 (UTC)

The use of the word "would" signifies that this is "a situation that you can imagine happening" [2].

Also, please don't remove the cn tag. Every sentence should be backed by sources and if this one cannot be, then it shouldn't be in the article. Alaexis_¿question? 11:59, 27 October 2024 (UTC)

I... what would you accept as an alternative formulation of the sentence? The content of the section itself makes it abundantly clear that it is something that can be imagined happening, and to claim one way or the other is explicitly WP:CRYSTALBALL if not hilariously not WP:NPOV. Smallangryplanet (talk) 13:54, 27 October 2024 (UTC)

What is the purpose of this sentence? The rest of the paragraph describes with the current/historical situation. I just don't see what additional information it gives to the reader. Alaexis_¿question? 21:40, 27 October 2024 (UTC)

WP:CRYSTALBALL does not apply here. We aren't speculating but simply presenting opinions by WP:RS as per WP:DUE. Some other examples where we see this are:

1. Judeo-Catalan (uses is debated for the question of whether the subject even exists)
2. Theia_(planet) (uses is debated for a topic related to the subject)

As per WP:BURDEN, All content must be verifiable... It is satisfied by providing an inline citation to a reliable source that directly supports the contribution. The current content already meets this bar as the claim is backed by reliable sources.

Your suggestion is a violation of WP:NOR as well as WP:CRYSTALBALL. CoolAndUniqueUsername (talk) 15:16, 27 October 2024 (UTC)

I have nothing against "is debated." Which sources back this sentence? Alaexis_¿question? 21:33, 27 October 2024 (UTC)

I'm assuming good faith, so won't accuse you of WP:BADGER. Picking at random, the 2nd paragraph citing Moussa Abu Marzouk who served as the VP of Hamas' political bureau directly addresses this point. As does the next paragraph which goes into the scholarship of Martin Kear.

Again, as per WP:CRYSTALBALL we can't predict the future. If tomorrow we see the collapse of Israel and the establishment of Palestinian sovereignty including the political rise of Hamas, we cannot know what will definitely happen. However, the works cited in the section provides credibility to the opinion that there definitely is a debate about whether Hamas will recognize Israel with strong points from all sides. CoolAndUniqueUsername (talk) 23:03, 27 October 2024 (UTC)

This is not a sufficient source. We have other Hamas leaders saying different things. In 2024 [Meshaal] pointed out that this position “comes to facilitate Palestinian and Arab consensus at this stage, but without giving up any part of our right or our land and without recognising the usurping entity [Israel].” [3]

To be able to write such a general statement we need to make sure it reflects the consensus of scholarly sources. Alaexis_¿question? 23:04, 29 October 2024 (UTC)

Recognition of Israel - removal of sourced info

“ After Hamas had won the 2006 elections, the recognition of Israel was one of the preconditions the Middle East Quartet set for Hamas to receive diplomatic acknowledgement and engagement. Hamas refused to accept it.

Graham Usher said that while Hamas did not consider Israel to be legitimate, it accepted Israel as political reality. According to Martin Kear "Hamas operationalises its resistance to Israeli occupation through its invocation of jihad" and therefore refuses to recognize Israel as a legitimate actor.

”

Why were the first and last sentence removed here? They discuss the recognition which is the topic of this section. If the problem with mentioning the quartet's conditions is that it was 18 years ago, then Usher's opinion should go too since it was written at the same time and in the context of the same 2006 elections (This article examines the lead-up to the recent Palestinian legislative elections). Alaexis_¿question? 19:27, 26 October 2024 (UTC)

It was removed because the claims were misrepresented, and the quartet condition was removed because it was immediately superseded by the Kear quote. (Usher's one was not.) Smallangryplanet (talk) 08:41, 27 October 2024 (UTC)

I'm not sure I understand. Kear's quote (According to Martin Kear, without expressly stating it Hamas agreed to respect the Oslo Accords, and by extension Israel's existence: "The signing of the 2007 Mecca Agreement also meant that Hamas had met two of the three stipulations set down by Israel and the Quartet: recognising Israel and respecting all previous Israeli-Palestinian agreements") does not supersede what Seurat and Musgrave wrote. If their opinions differ we should describe all of them per WP:DUE.

Which claims were misrepresented? The text I added "Hamas operationalises its resistance to Israeli occupation through its invocation of jihad" and therefore refuses to recognize Israel as a legitimate actor says exactly the same that Kear wrote In contrast, Hamas operationalises its resistance to Israeli occupation through its invocation of jihad . Accordingly, Hamas refuses to recognise Israel as a legitimate actor, and is willing to inflict violence on Israeli military and civilian targets. Alaexis_¿question? 11:50, 27 October 2024 (UTC)

The section about the Quartet suggested that Hamas had not met the conditions, full stop, but we can see that they conditionally met 2/3 of them.

I think we have differing understandings of what that section of the Kear source is saying. Here's the full quote:

Israel ensures its self-defence by asserting control over land through occupation, particularly in the West Bank. As discussed in Chapter 3, Israel’s control is achieved through expulsion, land confiscation, settlement building, and economic and political restrictions (Kapitan 2011: 495). Israeli governments have also propagated the narrative that any concrete moves towards an independent Palestine represents a direct threat to the existence of the Israeli state. This allows the GoI to characterise any form of resistance from Palestinians as acts of terrorism. This applies particularly to Hamas, whose resistance to Israeli occupation is understood by the GoI in purely military terms. As discussed earlier, affixing value-laden terms like ‘terrorist’ onto Hamas allows Israel to depict Hamas’s resistance efforts as lying outside the boundaries of acceptable political behaviour. Because the type and levels of violence utilised by Hamas cannot be considered as ordinary, but extraordinary, it necessitates that Israel respond with levels of force that are extraordinary to deter and punish Hamas and its supporters (Strom & Irvin 2007: 586). In contrast, Hamas operationalises its resistance to Israeli occupation through its invocation of jihad. Accordingly, Hamas refuses to recognise Israel as a legitimate actor, and is willing to inflict violence on Israeli military and civilian targets (Baracskay 2015: 526). Within Israel’s self-defence discourse, Hamas uses the concept of jihad to injure the Israeli state, and to bring about its eventual downfall (Litvak 2010: 721–722).

Seen in isolation, the sentence you paraphrased - crucially, missing the in contrast - gives the impression that Hamas just kind of... does that, for some mysterious reason... while the full quote makes it clear that Hamas is responding like for like, but in a situation in which anything it does will be perceived as 'terrorism' even when it is perfectly legitimate under international law to resist "expulsion, land confiscation, settlement building, and economic and political restrictions" by any means, including force. Smallangryplanet (talk) 14:10, 27 October 2024 (UTC)

But this is the article about Hamas, not Israel. There are plenty other articles in which the Israeli policy is discussed. This section is not about their designation as a terrorist organisation but only about their recognition of Israel. The first part of the paragraph you cited tells us nothing about this is is simply irrelevant for this section. Alaexis_¿question? 21:56, 27 October 2024 (UTC)

It would be WP:UNDUE to ignore the context of Israel in a section about Hamas' potential recognition of Israel. The first part of the paragraph in question explains why Hamas' recognition of Israel is complicated, since Israel treats any activity towards an independent Palestine (violent, non violent, etc) as a direct threat. Leave that out, and we end up suggesting that the Hamas/Israel relationship is solely because of some unspecified malevolence on Hamas' side, which is an obvious NPOV violation as well as a WP:NOTADVOCACY issue, because we would then be advocating for exactly the view described in the first couple of sentences of that paragraph. Smallangryplanet (talk) 11:08, 28 October 2024 (UTC)

It looks like we'll need an RfC. Any reader who'll get to this point in the article will know about the Israeli occupation, we don't need to repeat it everywhere. Alaexis_¿question? 22:59, 29 October 2024 (UTC)

Right. I am not saying we need to include the entire quote. You asked me which claims were misrepresented, and I was answering that and explaining why. I don't think we need an RFC here; we just need to include like one extra sentence.

Graham Usher said that while Hamas did not consider Israel to be legitimate, it accepted Israel as political reality. According to Martin Kear, because Israel treats "any form of resistance from Palestinians as acts of terrorism", and therefore responds to any resistance with extraordinary force, Hamas responds by operationalizing "...its resistance to Israeli occupation through its invocation of jihad ... Accordingly, Hamas refuses to recognise Israel as a legitimate actor..."[4]

This way we avoid mischaracterising Kear's comments. Smallangryplanet (talk) 10:31, 30 October 2024 (UTC)

Added this to the Recognition section. 👍🏻 Smallangryplanet (talk) 11:51, 30 October 2024 (UTC)

No, "in contrast" is not the same thing as "because". The author contrasts the attitudes of the two sides towards each other, that's it. Alaexis_¿question? 22:08, 30 October 2024 (UTC)

Fixed. Smallangryplanet (talk) 14:03, 31 October 2024 (UTC)

Middle East Quarter conditions

Okay, let's look at these two issues separately. You wrote The section about the Quartet suggested that Hamas had not met the conditions, full stop, but we can see that they conditionally met 2/3 of them. This is not how we deal with disagreements amongst sources. We have Musgrave saying on p. 136 that The second precondition was ‘recognition of Israel, ...As expected, Hamas immediately refused to acquiesce to these principles. Seurat says on p. 67 that the recognition of Israel was an unacceptable demand[] in the eyes of Hamas. Then we have Kear who thinks that they implicitly recognised Israel. Per WP:DUE we should mention the main viewpoints and give due weight to them - in this case we have more sources that say that Hamas did not recognise Israel. Alaexis_¿question? 21:52, 27 October 2024 (UTC)

In this case I think we should omit both pieces of information, because we risk WP:SYNTH-ing two pieces of speculative information into a new conclusion. Smallangryplanet (talk) 11:11, 28 October 2024 (UTC)

No, that's not how it works. WP:DUE is very clear about it Neutrality requires that mainspace articles and pages fairly represent all significant viewpoints that have been published by reliable sources, in proportion to the prominence of each viewpoint in those sources. There are two viewpoints and we need to represent both in proportion to their prominence. Alaexis_¿question? 22:57, 29 October 2024 (UTC)

Okay, in that case shall we put the Quartet discussion in the 2006-2007 section instead? Smallangryplanet (talk) 10:24, 30 October 2024 (UTC)

Yeah, that makes sense. Alaexis_¿question? 22:14, 30 October 2024 (UTC)

I'm reading Usher's article now and he's also writing about the recognition in the context of the 2006-2007 political developments (the section which supports the text in the article starts with The precondition for any accommodation is going to be flexibility on Hamas’s part. And since the elections, Hamas has been shoveling out flexibility in spades. I believe that it should also be moved to the 2006–2007 subsection. Alaexis_¿question? 22:25, 30 October 2024 (UTC)

I've also read Usher and he's not making a conditional claim based on the election, he's making a more general statement w/r/t Hamas' overall position on accepting Israel as a political reality. He notes that Hamas reasserted its long term hudna or ceasefire proposal, which predates 2006 (and extends pretty far into the period after). So IMO it should be kept in the general section. Smallangryplanet (talk) 10:04, 31 October 2024 (UTC)

Looks like we'll need an RfC... Alaexis_¿question? 22:53, 31 October 2024 (UTC)

@Alaexis what for? Smallangryplanet (talk) 10:32, 1 November 2024 (UTC)

The first sentence, the relevance of discussing Israeli policy in an article about Hamas and whether Usher's statements should have a year. Alaexis_¿question? 14:36, 2 November 2024 (UTC)

@Alaexis made the RFC here per your request. I also included the Baconi point since I see you've challenged that as well, so figured best to do it all at once. Smallangryplanet (talk) 12:04, 3 November 2024 (UTC)

References

MOS:INFOBOXPURPOSE and WP:CATV

Per MOS:INFOBOXPURPOSE and WP:CATV, context about Hamas' militarism and anti-imperialism needs to be added to the article body, otherwise those respective descriptors must be removed from the infobox and category list. Adding ideologies, especially with "disputed" in parentheses, without adding an explanation in the article body is not an improvement. Readers are left more confused than when they began reading: What militarism? Opposition to what kind of imperialism by whom? What dispute? Who claims these labels? etc. Yue🌙 18:45, 27 October 2024 (UTC)

Extended-confirmed-protected edit request on 28 October 2024

In the History category of the page at the very end it states: “On October 16, Sinwar was assassinated by Israeli agents.” This is inaccurate. It was published by many reliable sources that Sinwar was killed by Israeli soldiers during a routine patrol in Rafah while he was trying to escape from his bunker together with 2 other Hamas militants. It was not an assassination. The Hamas militants were shooting at the Israeli forces and only after the Hamas militants were killed by the soldiers, they found out they killed Sinwar. Sources: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Killing_of_Yahya_Sinwar Davidn7272 (talk) 11:49, 28 October 2024 (UTC)

 Done @Davidn7272 Good point - fixed. Smallangryplanet (talk) 13:04, 28 October 2024 (UTC)

Add hyperlink to improve readability.

Hi. I've come across a sentence in the section Organization -> Finances and Funding where the word 'waqf' is mentioned. At first I assumed it was a typo, but there does exist a Wikipedia page explaining what 'waqf' is/means here: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Waqf. A quick search shows that there are two other mentions of 'waqf'in the Wikipedia page for Hamas, both of which are linked to the Wikipedia page for it. My suggestion is that this particular instance of the word is also linked to the Wikipedia page in order to avoid confusion. 2A02:A46F:9269:0:55BB:652D:D698:676F (talk) 20:54, 28 October 2024 (UTC)

This makes sense.  Done Smallangryplanet (talk) 12:50, 29 October 2024 (UTC)

Edit request from a perm-banned user from the Palestine-Israel conflict area

I'm perm-banned user from the Palestine-Israel conflict area. But I would like someone to add their official telegram channel to the infobox in website parameter. Here it is according to their official website. Al-Qassam Brigades has it so I thought this article should too. I'm not gonna engage in this discussion to avoid any problems. Thx! ☆SuperNinja2☆ TALK! 18:31, 30 October 2024 (UTC)

 Not done: There should be at most one external link for each article's primary topic, per WP:EL. I also don't see the encyclopedic benefit of adding a link to Hamas' communications. Yue🌙 23:00, 30 October 2024 (UTC)

Baconi as a source

Tareq Baconi is a research fellow but he's also a board membet of Al-Shabaka, a think tank that aims to strengthen[] the popular movement for Palestinian liberation with the theoretical and analytical policy foundations to both dismantle the current structures of oppression and build a liberated future. So it's clearly a biased source, it's not necessarily unreliable per WP:BIASED but it should not be given undue weight. If it's used it should be balanced by other sources that have different views. Alaexis_¿question? 14:34, 2 November 2024 (UTC)

Baconi is an excellent source, a recognized expert on Hamas, one we should use more of. His book, Hamas Contained was published by Stanford University Press[4] and cited 112 times. VR _{(Please ping on reply)} 05:24, 10 November 2024 (UTC)

RFC: Recognition of Israel Section

Another editor (Alaexis) has suggested a simpler/clearer version of this RfC and I will go ahead and unilaterally close this so that we can use this one, instead. Smallangryplanet (talk) 10:44, 6 November 2024 (UTC)
The following discussion has been closed. Please do not modify it.
The current Recognition of Israel section contains the following elements: 1. Whether Hamas would recognize Israel is debated.[142][143][144] Hamas leaders have emphasized they do not recognize Israel,[77] but indicate they "have a de facto acceptance of its presence".[145] Hamas's acceptance of the 1967 borders acknowledges the existence of another entity on the other side.[130] Some scholars believe Hamas's acceptance of the 1967 borders implicitly recognizes Israel.[131][146] 2. According to Martin Kear, Israel treats "any form of resistance from Palestinians as acts of terrorism", and therefore responds to any resistance with extraordinary force. In contrast, writes Kear, Hamas operationalizes "...its resistance to Israeli occupation through its invocation of jihad ... Accordingly, Hamas refuses to recognise Israel as a legitimate actor..."[148] However, Kear goes on to note that without expressly stating it Hamas agreed to respect the Oslo Accords, and by extension Israel's existence: "The signing of the 2007 Mecca Agreement also meant that Hamas had met two of the three stipulations set down by Israel and the Quartet: recognising Israel and respecting all previous Israeli-Palestinian agreements."[148] 3. Graham Usher said that while Hamas did not consider Israel to be legitimate, it accepted Israel as political reality.[149] Tareq Baconi explains that Hamas' implicit recognition of Israel is in contrast to most Israeli political parties who have long opposed the idea of a Palestinian state.[150][145] Option 1: Keep all three elements as they are Option 2: Remove or alter one of the three elements, specify which exactly and how you wish to alter it (remove entirely, add something to it, etc.) Option 3: Remove or make additions to all three elements, for example, remove line 1, keep the truncated version of the Kear quote without any additional information, add year specification to Usher and remove Baconi (or if possible, include RS with alternate opinions) For the Talk page discussions on each of these elements see for 1: this link for 2: this link and also this one, for 3: this link. Smallangryplanet (talk) 11:32, 3 November 2024 (UTC) Note There is an ongoing discussion below that may result in changes to the wording of the questions and answer options. Hopefully the RfC would be finalised shortly. Alaexis¿question? 22:47, 5 November 2024 (UTC) Survey Option 1: For the reasons I've listed below in the discussion section, of which the tl;dr is basically that I think it would be WP:UNDUE to not include information about Israel in a section about Hamas' recognition (or not) of same. It's all RS content and the challenges to it seem like an attempt to dilute strongly established facts based on RS. Smallangryplanet (talk) 12:28, 3 November 2024 (UTC) Regarding the first bit of content, I'm not sure about including have a de facto acceptance of its presence without attribution. I don't have access to that source, but I assume it's based on the "national consensus" sentence, which other scholars interpret a bit differently. The Legrain source calls it a de facto armistice without a de jure recognition. Legrain is essentially describing a hypothetical scenario where Israel withdraws to 1967 borders and Hamas cease fires in pragmatic recognition of the current power dynamics, while ultimately maintaining that no part of the land of Palestine shall be compromised or conceded. Legrain calls it a false object of satisfaction to interpret this scenario as a two-state solution, which would imply safe and recognized borders. Also while there have been some murmurs about the possibility that Hamas would recognize, e.g. in an interview with Mousa Abu Marzook, I think it's broadly considered unlikely and not particularly "debated". — xDanielx T/C\R 19:18, 4 November 2024 (UTC) Bad RFC. RFC is not neutral and too hard to respond to. Andre🚐 22:00, 4 November 2024 (UTC) @Andrevan, what would you suggest? We definitely need external feedback here... Alaexis¿question? 22:10, 4 November 2024 (UTC) How about a simple question about how to treat Hamas' claims versus the de facto realities. Should the article present Hamas' recognition of Israel as: 1) real, 2) false, or 3) debated. Andre🚐 22:18, 4 November 2024 (UTC) @Andrevan I have to disagree, I see nothing wrong with this RFC and how it was posed. It's neutral, and the only reason it covers three separate elements is because @Alaexis challenged all those elements and wanted an RFC for them. I don't understand why we'd want to waste time and run an individual RFC for each one, and it's certainly not any less neutral if they are done separately when they can be taken together. Smallangryplanet (talk) 22:43, 4 November 2024 (UTC) It's not WP:RFCNEUTRAL because it's a leading question. It's not WP:RFCBRIEF. I'm not saying you can't ask more than one question but I asked the question that seems to be the root question: do we give Hamas any credit for seeming to accept Israel or do we present the reliable sources who doubt, with good reason, the sincerity of those commitments, or portray a balance (at the risk of a WP:FALSEBALANCE?)? This RFC is in the weeds with the current text. I understand why and I'm not saying it's a POV-pushing RFC, I'm saying it's not neutral because it favors the specific textual portions already present and it's hard to unpack the actual issue. Andre🚐 22:47, 4 November 2024 (UTC) The text that's in the section right now - including the phrases that this RfC is about / were challenged - are all backed by RS. So abstracting away the entire section into three vague, general standards of "Agree that Hamas recognizes, doesn't agree, or in the middle" does nothing to resolve the specific challenges being made, and will dump us deeper into the weeds. That question is also malformed, and ignores entirely the issue of de facto vs de jure recognition, which the current RS in the section discusses. Smallangryplanet (talk) 23:30, 4 November 2024 (UTC) You could still write a better, more neutral RFC with more specific propositions. E.g. should the article cite Kear, yes or no? Andre🚐 23:38, 4 November 2024 (UTC) That is not the question at hand here! If you would like to create a separate RfC for that, be my guest. But this is what I thought @Alaexis and I agreed on as topics for an RfC. So that is why this content is in here. I don't know what else to tell you. Smallangryplanet (talk) 23:43, 4 November 2024 (UTC) Well, we have one more editor who also thinks that it's an odd RfC, so maybe Andrevan is right. I'm struggling with coming up with a reasonable number of questions with a small number of mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive answers that would cover all the issues we've been discussing. Still, maybe we should stop the current RfC and try to streamline the questions: Q1: Should we discuss the hypothetical recognition and how prominently? A. Yes, the way it's done now. B. Yes, less prominently C. No Q2: Should we mention the Israeli framing of the conflict with Hamas per Kear in the recognition section? A. Yes B. No Q3: How should we include Usher's 2006 opinion? A. In the recognition section without the year B. In the recognition section with the year C. In the evolution of positions section D. Nowhere in the article. WDYT? @Andrevan@Moxy@Smallangryplanet@XDanielx? Alaexis¿question? 18:28, 5 November 2024 (UTC) That seems like an improvement IMHO Andre🚐 18:32, 5 November 2024 (UTC) This is infinitely worse and more convoluted than the current RfC. It expands the options from 3 that cover each of the issues that were raised to 9. We should proceed with the current RfC as is. Raskolnikov.Rev (talk) 18:37, 5 November 2024 (UTC) The current three options aren't really three options though, since options 2 and 3 have infinite sub-options within them. — xDanielx T/C\R 18:38, 5 November 2024 (UTC) Actually I think you're right, though there's a potential problem with Q1 B being too vague and also not resolving it if chosen. I think @Smallangryplanet should consider reposting the RfC with the options proposed by @Alaexis. The rest of the RfC looks fine though. Raskolnikov.Rev (talk) 18:57, 5 November 2024 (UTC) We can make Q1 more specific, for example "Should the section on the recognition of Israel by Hamas discuss hypothetical recognition (whether Hamas would recognise Israel) and how prominently, based on the sources in the current version?" A. Yes, in the first sentence. B. Yes, less prominently later in the section. C. No Alaexis¿question? 21:38, 5 November 2024 (UTC) @Raskolnikov.Rev in case we'll have a reworded RfC, I think it'd be better to wait until we restart it before answering. Otherwise it'll be a mess and the uninvolved users whose input we're seeking would be confused. Alaexis¿question? 21:42, 5 November 2024 (UTC) Yes that's clearer. Maybe add "Yes, in the first sentence as in current version", to clarify that's the status quo position. Raskolnikov.Rev (talk) 22:52, 5 November 2024 (UTC) This seems like an improvement, though to take a step back, is an RfC needed? We could hold a brief RfC to collect some input, but I don't think the goal should be to reach decisions which get cemented with a formal close, making it difficult to adjust in the future. I think that should be more of a last resort for when there's a history of controversy and edit warring over certain specific issues. — xDanielx T/C\R 18:45, 5 November 2024 (UTC) I also agree with this, good to have a brief RfC to gather input, but shouldn't necessarily be constrained by it. Raskolnikov.Rev (talk) 18:58, 5 November 2024 (UTC) Yeah - I agree with this, and the Q1 improvements here. Much clearer than my attempt. I'll close this RFC - shall I open a new one with updated questions or do you want to go for it, @Alaexis? @XDanielx I think it is good to have a formal RfC just because then we can come to a decision hopefully w/uninvolved external editors chiming in, rather than having to go around in circles about these things for ages. Smallangryplanet (talk) 10:38, 6 November 2024 (UTC) Odd RFC..... My only suggestion would be no journalistic quotefarm...as per WP:QUOTECRUFT.Moxy🍁 23:48, 4 November 2024 (UTC) Option 1 The first sentence is backed by RS directly and the rest of the section, and there is no reason whatsoever to remove or alter it. It clearly is a debated question whether or not Hamas would recognize Israel, and the de facto versus de jure recognition issue is intrinsically bound up with that, as is immediately clarified by the subsequent sentences and again the section more broadly. The second sentence accurately cites an RS on the question of recognition. Removing essential parts of that to solely keep the part saying Hamas is "devoted to Jihad" fundamentally distorts Kears' analysis. The third sentence containing Usher does not require a date specifation as he is making a general analysis and claim and not a conditional one, which moreover was further confirmed by later events and is backed by the other RS in the same section, including the Baconi immediately following it, which should also be kept because it is RS. Perceived bias does not mean that a source is not RS.Raskolnikov.Rev (talk) 18:34, 5 November 2024 (UTC) Option 1 The RFC seems a bit like overkill but I can't really see any significant problems here that can't be resolved in the usual way. Selfstudier (talk) 18:37, 5 November 2024 (UTC) Discussion @Alaexis has argued that the first sentence of the first example should be removed as it is not backed by sources (though these have now been added), and that the second must remove any mention of Israel/the occupation and de facto recognition on relevance grounds - This section is not about their designation as a terrorist organisation but only about their recognition of Israel. This would mean the Kear quote would solely consist of "Hamas operationalizes...its resistance to Israeli occupation through its invocation of jihad ... Accordingly, Hamas refuses to recognise Israel as a legitimate actor...". The third example must include a year specification for Usher because it is somehow a conditional statement, superseded by other events, and Baconi needs to be removed or balanced out for bias/WP:DUE reasons. I have argued that the first line was backed by sources in the entire section, and have now added direct sources (of varying viewpoints) as well. It should stay as is because it is RS backed content that is relevant to the section. On the second example w/r/t Kear I have argued that if it is to be included on the page, it has to be done so with proper context including Kear's actual position on the question of Hamas' potential recognition of Israel. This means including that Kear does not solely describe Hamas as a fanatical jihadist group, a frankly gross distortion of Kear's actual position in the cited text, which includes the context of Kear saying that Hamas may have de facto recognized Israel. Regarding the Usher line (3rd example) the point has been made extensively that no year specification is necessary here, as it is not standard Wiki style guide to add year specifications without good reason – such as the statement indeed being conditional, contextual, or later reversed by the speaker, in which case we would need to mention that as well. (In the case of conditional/contextual there wouldn't even be a reason to include it here.) Usher was explicitly not making a conditional statement, but rather a general one: Few Palestinians believe Hamas could ever recognize Israel as a legitimate polity as opposed to a “political reality,” which it already accepts... Usher's statement is backed by other sources in this and the following section from 2018-2024, which is unsurprising as this conclusion was only strengthened in the years since, with Hamas' signing of the Mecca Agreement in 2007, the repeated reassertions of the long-term ceasefire/hudna, which extend to beyond October 2023, and the 2017 rewrite of the Hamas charter. There is also no evidence that Usher changed his own view on the matter. The statement is not conditional and there is no reason to add a date specification to it and thus make it artificially appear conditional and possibly superseded by later events. Additionally when it comes to Baconi, the claim that it is not WP:DUE is solely based on his affiliation to a group that seeks "Palestinian liberation." But bias does not mean that a source is not reliable/RS, and in the case of Baconi - a subject matter academic expert, I see now reason whatsoever to remove it. If Alaexis has NPOV concerns they can add RS sources to counter it, as they attempted to do with Kear (and Seurat) while misrepresenting them. Smallangryplanet (talk) 12:24, 3 November 2024 (UTC) Comment I don't want to be a wet blanket but there are some problems with this RFC. The RFC needs to be neutrally worded and not contain arguments, those can be included below the line as part of !votes or in discussion. It needs to be simplified as much as possible, what is this really all about, whether Hamas recognized Israel or not? And then to what extent? Else random !voters are likely to get a bit confused, my 2 cents. Selfstudier (talk) 11:53, 3 November 2024 (UTC) Good point @Selfstudier, I've updated it to suit, I think. (This is the first time I'm submitting an RfC) Is this better? Smallangryplanet (talk) 12:25, 3 November 2024 (UTC) Comment In Chapman, C. (2024). Whose Promised Land?: The Continuing Conflict over Israel and Palestine - 5th Edition. SPCK. ISBN 978-0-281-09062-4. Retrieved 2024-11-03., Chapman cites Hamas: A Beginner's Guide by Khālid Ḥarūb which explains the (rather obvious, I would have thought) link to Israeli recognition of a 2 state solution. "Recognition" in the usual sense is a 2 way street. Selfstudier (talk) 17:09, 3 November 2024 (UTC) I've already added that source (Hamas: A Beginner's Guide) to the first sentence complete with quote! Smallangryplanet (talk) 17:22, 3 November 2024 (UTC) Question 1: hypothetical recognition The sentence Whether Hamas would recognize Israel is debated should not be the first sentence of this section. We should start with facts rather with WP:CRYSTALBALL speculations. It's like starting the article about the Golan Heights "Whether Israel would return the Golan Heights to Syria is debated" [5]. The "debate" framing is not supported by the sources. The USIP source actually states that "Hamas might never 'recognize' Israel in the conventional sense" - this is not evidence of debate, but rather the opposite [6]. The Haaretz article refers to a single statement by Abu Marzouk suggesting possible recognition, which was directly contradicted by Abu Marzouk himself just one week prior when he explicitly rejected recognition of Israel [7] The overwhelming preponderance of statements from Hamas leadership consistently reject recognition. This creates a WP:FALSEBALANCE issue - we're presenting a single outlier statement as equal to the organization's consistent official position. Khaled Hroub's analysis of conditions under which Hamas might theoretically recognize Israel can be included later in the section but it should not be presented as the leading framing. Alaexis¿question? 21:43, 4 November 2024 (UTC) I agree with this. The other source argues that it's "not inconceivable". There's a bit of variation among sources in terms of whether it won't happen or it's possible but unlikely; in any case I'm not seeing any "debate". — xDanielx T/C\R 21:56, 4 November 2024 (UTC) Question 2: Israeli policy The current use of Martin Kear's quote has issues with WP:COATRACK and WP:UNDUE. The section's scope is specifically about Hamas's position on recognizing Israel, but the quote begins with an extended discussion of Israeli policy. Kear contrasts the framing used by Israel (any form of resistance from Palestinians as acts of terrorism) and Hamas (it operationalizes its resistance to Israeli occupation through its invocation of jihad ... Accordingly, Hamas refuses to recognise Israel as a legitimate actor). He does not establish any causal relationship between them. He doesn't argue that Hamas's position on recognition is a response to or influenced by Israeli policy. The passage should be trimmed to only include the relevant portion about Hamas's policy Hamas operationalizes its resistance to Israeli occupation through its invocation of jihad and accordingly refuses to recognise Israel as a legitimate actor. Alaexis¿question? 22:02, 4 November 2024 (UTC) Question 3: Usher Usher wrote it in 2006 before the takeover of Gaza by Hamas, several small-scale conflicts between Hamas and Israel, the 2017 document and the current war. There are many sources published in the last 5-10 years that deal with the policy of Hamas. We don't need it in this section, we should rather move the sentence to the Hamas#Evolution of positions section. Alaexis¿question? 22:08, 4 November 2024 (UTC) References

Smallangryplanet, would you like to start a new RfC yourself or should I do it? Alaexis_¿question? 22:46, 8 November 2024 (UTC)

Alaexis Ah, sorry - created a new one here. Smallangryplanet (talk) 11:17, 9 November 2024 (UTC)

Minor info regarding previous "failed verifications"

@Alaexis Though the issue seems to have already been settled, I just wanted to post what the original sources were citing in hopes it might prove helpful in someway.

Bjorn Brenner's Gaza Under Hamas: From Islamic Democracy to Islamist Governance states on the bottom of pg. 204

"This new document, a new charter, included substantial revisions of Hamas's policy positions, including a de facto recognition of Israel, while removing its previous anti-Semitic language and religious overtones."

Tareq Y. Ismael's Government and politics of the contemporary Middle East : continuity and change states on pg. 88

"In research conducted by the Ramallah-based Near East Consulting Institute, 77 per cent of Hamas supporters responded in favour of a negotiated settlement to the conflict;°” moreover, Hamas on multiple occasions has accepted, in principle, the existence of Israel, as delineated by its 1967 borders” and dropped the call for destruction of Israel from its manifesto." Butterscotch Beluga (talk) 23:01, 6 November 2024 (UTC)

The question is whether tangentially related information (like Hamas dropping the calls for the destruction of Israel from their manifesto) belongs to this section. It's not directly related - it's possible to not call for a country's destruction while not recognising it.

We have two options

1. Narrow scope - we only mention sources that discuss the recognition explicitly. In this case and note that the group has "dropped the call for the destruction of Israel from its manifesto" should be removed from the section.
2. Broad scope - we include related stuff like "acceptance in principle", "calls for destruction", etc. I have no problem with this approach but then we should be mindful of NPOV and not present one scholar's opinion as a fact when in fact a disagreement exists (for example not all scholars agree that the 2017 document de facto recognised Israel).

Alaexis_¿question? 22:44, 8 November 2024 (UTC)

I don't think the whole quotations are strictly necessary to confirm their stance on potential recognition, but I do think these quotations explicitly relate to the topic i.e. "a de facto recognition of Israel".

I'm uncertain on how this info should be specifically handled however, but I try to double check failed verifications when I can to see if the community can find anything salvageable. Likewise, I was only giving the whole quote in an attempt to put them in their proper context. Butterscotch Beluga (talk) 23:16, 8 November 2024 (UTC)

imposed a complete blockade of the Gaza Strip

How can it be "a complete blockade of the Gaza Strip" when Gaza Strip has an open border with Egypt? When tens of thousands of Gazan were crossing daily to Israel to work and bring money to Gaza (until Oct 7, 2023, when Gaza assaulted Israel, butchering 1,200 Israelis in a single day, see 7 October Hamas-led attack on Israel)? See Palestinian workers in Israel. Ehud Amir (talk) 06:16, 8 November 2024 (UTC)

This should use language from Blockade_of_the_Gaza_Strip. – SJ + 22:59, 8 November 2024 (UTC)

1988 Charter

Re: this thread from last month, which was already archived

Shouldn't the [never-revoked] 1988 Charter be properly introduced in the lead (and not just in relation to the 2017 charter)? Removed here. BobFromBrockley (talk) 10:58, 3 October 2024 (UTC) Pinging Makeandtoss - was it the word "genocidal" (which I thought summarised body, but could easily be dropped)? BobFromBrockley (talk) 14:21, 3 October 2024 (UTC)

As the most-referenced document in the org's history, it was noticeably buried in the lede. Most coverage of Hamas before 2017, and most discussions of the new 2017 document, address the uncompromising calls for jihad in the 1988 document. Your previous edit also felt a bit out of the flow however, and there's also a bit of duplication in that paragraph. I took a pass at cleaning it up w/ existing language. – SJ + 22:59, 8 November 2024 (UTC)

There is a particular confusion about the relationship between the 2017 Hamas policy document and the 1988 covenant/charter which I've only seen on Wikipedia: whether discussions about the history of Hamas as a movement should describe its purpose and principles in terms of the 2017 document, and how much space to devote to discussing 'differences' between 1988 and 2017 documents (which are in no way two revisions of the same text, in length or scope or language).

I used the term 'policy document' for the 2017 doc when it is introduced for the first time, to avoid that confusion. – SJ + 01:09, 9 November 2024 (UTC)

What exactly is the confusion about the 2017 Hamas charter that is explicitly referred to as such in the cited RS, and its relationship to the 1988 charter which is explained concisely and clearly per the cited RS?

Regarding whether the purpose and principles of Hamas ought to also be described in terms of the 2017 document (it is not solely done so), and how much space to devote to the difference between that and its 1988 charter, I am open to suggestions on how to alter that, but the changes you made did not adequately reflect the cited RS, and for some reason minimized the import of the former in favor of the latter, despite the fact that that is the new charter. The name change from "2017 charter" to "document" that you put through the entire article further reflects that. Raskolnikov.Rev (talk) 01:53, 9 November 2024 (UTC)

Hello RR, the point of confusion I meant is captured by the phrase "While the 1988... the 2017 charter removed the antisemitic language", which implies a) that there is a single bit of 'antisemitic language' in 1988 to remove, b) that 2017 revised 1988 rather than being an additional complementary document, c) that there is no antisemitic language in 2017. These specific claims are not made in the sources, and there are better ways to summarize differences between the two charter/documents than by using the language of 'removal'.

Something that notes that the 2017 principles toned down certain kinds of language, while still being considered antisemitic in less obvious ways, might better capture what a range of analysts seem to say about the two documents in relation to one another, and in relation to the interviews with movement leaders saying that the new publication reflects not a change of principles but an adaptation to a changing environment.

I tried to clean up less contentious parts of that paragraph, which should introduce the original charter when discussing the origins of the movement around 1988, but left the last sentence for discussion here. – SJ + 23:22, 11 November 2024 (UTC)

"These specific claims are not made in the sources, and there are better ways to summarize differences between the two charter/documents than by using the language of 'removal'."

This is not true. The first cited source, Seurat, explicitly states this: "Another noteworthy change: the anti-Semitic overtones of the Charter were entirely scrapped, replaced by a distinction made between the struggle against Zionism and enmity against the Jews."

And there are many other RS that say the 2017 charter removed anti-Semitic language. Here is one published earlier this year that explicitly uses the same phrasing, saying "anti-Semitic clauses were removed" in the 2017 charter.

And here is another: "The new document contains none of the anti-Semitic articles and sentences that characterized the charter. Supporters of the movement, especially in the West, advised it long ago to change these provisions."

I will add that as an additional source.

I'm not sure why you are making a claim that is simply false and then removing content under the guise of "stylistic cleanup" when it's clearly a major POV changing edit that requires consensus to go ahead.

Please seek consensus for it first before editing that again. Raskolnikov.Rev (talk) 23:34, 11 November 2024 (UTC)

Sorry, but are you addressing me? I can't tell. First of all, lede is a summary of body, and it is already too long, so it needs trimming, not expansion. Second, the charter is already briefly mentioned in lede and anything beyond that is undue weight. It's not buried in the lede, its charters are already mentioned twice. Due weight is not determined by how much publicity something gets in public, particularly pro-Israeli, circles. Makeandtoss (talk) 07:37, 9 November 2024 (UTC)

• I also want to add that while the 1988 charter's mention appears later, the charter's ideas are not "buried in the lead". The second sentence says "While initially seeking a state in all of former Mandatory Palestine" – this is the core idea for which Israelis have a problem with Hamas, that they seek to replace Israel with a single state. Would it be better to rephrase this as "While initially seeking to replace Israel with a state in all of former Mandatory Palestine"? Raskolnikov.Rev, Sj, Makeandtoss, Bobfrombrockley.VR _{(Please ping on reply)} 05:31, 10 November 2024 (UTC)
• Sj, I find in this edit you misrepresent sources, but maybe I'm mistaken. You changed "began acquiescing to 1967 borders in the agreements" to "began referencing 1967 borders". Did you read the sources cited before you made such a significant change? The sources clearly say that in these agreements Hamas agreed to compromise to a Palestinian state within the 1967 borders, not that there was a mere "reference" to is.VR _{(Please ping on reply)} 17:14, 10 November 2024 (UTC)

  @Sj Once again made the same edit using the phrasing "referenced" instead of acquiesced even though that is matched in the cited RS. This appears to be an attempt to push a certain POV, which is fine if there is consensus for it, but there plainly isn't. These exact changes were proposed and rejected in the past. I don't know why they're being edited in again without seeking consensus for it in Talk.

  I already expressed my own opposition to changing it and agree with @Vice regent. Raskolnikov.Rev (talk) 22:40, 11 November 2024 (UTC)

  Hi Rev, I left a comment above as well. I don't see "acquiesce" anywhere in Seurat? If anything I'm trying to make the language neutral to the tension within Hamas that she describes throughout that source.

  "Hamas has always oscillated between its attachment to the ‘historical solution’, which foresees the liberation of the whole of Palestine, and its capacity to recognize the validity of the ‘interim solution’, which prescribes the creation of a state with the 1967 borders." (p.20);

  she quotes Abou Musameh in 2012, "For us, the struggle has not ended, and this is why the building of a Palestinian state on the 1967 borders remains a tactical goal. For Fatah, the conflict is over; this is why for them it is a strategic aim. We do not believe in a two-state solution. Fatah believes in the two-state solution; this is why they have recognized Israel." (p.48);

  she notes that "Meshal refuses to consider this document as a new Charter: he maintains that this document amends but does not abrogate the original 1988 Charter." (p.68)

  I don't think we should be choosing one or the other side of that tension to describe as 'the position of Hamas'. I'm not partial to 'referenced' but 'acquiesced' implies accepting without protest which in this case seems out of place. How about '[provisionally] accepted'? – SJ + 23:39, 11 November 2024 (UTC)

  Several points: Seurat is not the only source cited for that information, and the part of it that is cited matches her description of acquiescing to 1967 borders in the post 2005 period. In fact the passage is quoted in the cited source: "Indeed, since 2006, Hamas has unceasingly highlighted its acceptance of the 1967 borders, as well as accords signed by the PLO and Israel. This position has been an integral part of reconciliation agreements between Hamas and Fatah since 2005: the Cairo Agreement in 2005, the Prisoners' Document in 2006, the Mecca Agreement in 2007 and finally the Cairo and Doha Agreements in 2011 and 2012." pp. 17–19.

  There are many other parts in her text where she reiterates this point, for example p. 47:

  "Palestinian factions, the Prisoners’ Document, also called the National Conciliation Document (Wathîqat al-Wifâq al-watani). This text implicitly recognized the validity of the June 1967 borders and agreed on limiting resistance to the land occupied in 1967."

  p. 199:

  "Signed in June 2006 by Hamas and other Palestinian factions, the Prisoners’ Document implicitly recognized the June 1967 borders, agreed on the construction of a Palestinian state with Jerusalem as a capital and accepted limitations to the resistance in the territories occupied in 1967. It was approved on 28 June 2006, following consultations with the entire Political Bureau, whose extensive participation was confirmed by Khaled Hroub,9 Alvaro de Soto and Paola Caridi."

  The question of the 2017 charter being called a charter is not particularly controversial. There are countless RS that refer to it as a charter, they are cited as such, and the 2017 page is titled as such. If you disagree with this phrasing, you would have to make a separate case for why the 2017 charter should not be called that, and gain consensus for it.

  Regarding the use of the phrase "acquiesce", someone already brought this up over a month ago here, and failed to gain consensus that the phrase was not suitable for describing this because somehow not neutral. As I said in that discussion as well, I fail to see how this is the case.

  Acquiescing is I think more suitable than accepting because it contains exactly the reluctant nature of their acceptance of the 1967 borders and the fact that they resolutely opposed it beforehand. This is actually the more neutral phrasing of it.

  I would certainly oppose the addition of "provisionally" as that is simply not backed by the cited RS, but changing it to "began accepting 1967 borders" is also fine. I just see it as less accurate than "began acquiescing to 1967 borders in the agreements it signed", so that's still my preference. Raskolnikov.Rev (talk) 00:14, 12 November 2024 (UTC)

RfC: Semantics and Contents of Recognition of Israel Section

There are three questions:

1. Should the section on the recognition of Israel by Hamas discuss hypothetical recognition (whether Hamas would recognise Israel) and how prominently, based on the sources in the current version?
   1. Yes, in the first sentence as in the current version
   2. Yes, less prominently later in the section.
   3. No
2. Should we mention the Israeli framing of the conflict with Hamas per Kear in the recognition section?
   1. Yes (as in the current version)
   2. No
3. How should we include Usher's 2006 opinion?
   1. In the recognition section without the year (as in the current version)
   2. In the recognition section with the year
   3. In the evolution of positions section
   4. Nowhere in the article.

This is a revised version of a previous RfC.

Smallangryplanet (talk) 11:12, 9 November 2024 (UTC)

Survey (RfC: Semantics and Contents of Recognition of Israel Section)

• Procedural close: The question starts of by making a statement of fact about Hamas' recognition being hypothetical, which is a POV. This is not a brief, neutrally worded question. TarnishedPath^talk 07:29, 11 November 2024 (UTC)

  Here "would" is used to describe a hypothetical situation. I'm fine with replacing the current wording with "...discuss whether Hamas *would* recognise Israel..." if that helps and if the editors who have participated in the rfc don't mind. Alaexis_¿question? 21:18, 11 November 2024 (UTC)

  @Alaexis What's the proposed change, sorry? Change Should the section on the recognition of Israel by Hamas discuss hypothetical recognition (whether Hamas would recognise Israel)... to "Should the section on the recognition of Israel by Hamas discuss whether Hamas would recognise Israel..." ? Smallangryplanet (talk) 16:00, 12 November 2024 (UTC)

  Considering that we've got a new answer to this question, I don't think it's a good idea to change the wording at this point. Would-statements describe hypothetical situations - there is nothing non-neutral here. I would've be fine with the alternative I suggested but if we restart this whole thing again we'd be really testing the patience and attention span of uninvolved editors. Alaexis_¿question? 22:26, 12 November 2024 (UTC)

  Righto, I'll leave it alone. Smallangryplanet (talk) 13:04, 13 November 2024 (UTC)

Q1

• 1B, the sources don't support that there is a debate, it's a violation of WP:FALSEBALANCE (see more). Alaexis_¿question? 21:24, 11 November 2024 (UTC)
• 1B, it is hypothetical and there isn't agreement among secondary sources. – SJ + 22:07, 12 November 2024 (UTC)
• 1B per Alaexis and Sj. Andre🚐 23:04, 12 November 2024 (UTC)
• 1A There is RS, cited on the page right now, showing there clearly is debate on the matter with scholars saying there would be such recognition. That's just a factually accurate description of the cited RS. Raskolnikov.Rev (talk) 12:47, 13 November 2024 (UTC)
• 1A As I've said ad nauseam up and down this page, there's RS showing that there is debate, there is debate on this here talk page, we're quite simply describing reality. Smallangryplanet (talk) 13:14, 13 November 2024 (UTC)

Q2

• B. No. I don't see that Kear is the most germane here. Andre🚐 23:08, 12 November 2024 (UTC)
• A. Yes The cited RS is from a reputed subject-matter scholar, Martin Kear, whose book is specifically focused on this topic, and whose insights cited in the section are directly relevant to the question of recognition. See no reason whatsoever to remove this, but I agree with @VR's trim suggestion here. Raskolnikov.Rev (talk) 12:53, 13 November 2024 (UTC)
• A. Yes @VR / Raskolnikov.Rev trim suggestion is fine but otherwise I think it makes sense to keep this, Kear is a subject matter expert who is regularly cited on this topic (you can find plenty more citations with a google news search) and should be included here. Smallangryplanet (talk) 13:14, 13 November 2024 (UTC)

Q3

• 3 A. Usher's statement is notable and there's no clear reason to have a date (which is given in the citation). If we started putting dates on every sentence in this article, it would become an unreadable mess.VR _{(Please ping on reply)} 05:35, 10 November 2024 (UTC)
• 3 C. It was 18 years ago, lots of things have happened since then, including Hamas rejecting the two-state solution. It's like saying that Israel is ready to give East Jerusalem to Palestinians now because it was offered in 2008. Alaexis_¿question? 21:53, 10 November 2024 (UTC)
• 3C, even evaluations of what signing the prisoner's document meant changed in the years after 2006. – SJ + 22:07, 12 November 2024 (UTC)
• 3C per Alaexis and Sj. Andre🚐 23:05, 12 November 2024 (UTC)
• 3 A As I noted in the discussion here, Graham Usher is a subject-matter expert whose cited point on the page is not conditional, and in fact later events only further bolstered its accuracy. So there is no reason to remove this RS, and no reason to artificially make it appear as being conditional by adding a year specification. The Kear and Baconi back it up as well. Raskolnikov.Rev (talk) 12:58, 13 November 2024 (UTC)
• 3 A for the same reasons as @VR. There is no indication that Usher's opinion changed, either. Smallangryplanet (talk) 13:14, 13 November 2024 (UTC)

Discussion (RfC: Semantics and Contents of Recognition of Israel Section)

• Comment, can the filer of this RFC advise what has changed since Talk:Hamas/Archive 23#RFC: Should Hamas be described as accepting the 1967 Israeli borders in the lead? that this is being relitigated? TarnishedPath^talk 07:21, 11 November 2024 (UTC)

  Pinging @KlayCax, @Vice regent, @RadioactiveBoulevardier, @Bharell, @Iskandar323, @Senorangel, @Cjhard, @Penguino35, @Alaexis, @Mhhossein, @Aquillion, @חוקרת, @Selfstudier as editors who were involved in the discussion at Talk:Hamas/Archive 23#RFC: Should Hamas be described as accepting the 1967 Israeli borders in the lead?. TarnishedPath^talk 07:37, 11 November 2024 (UTC)

• At least if I read right, this RFC is talking solely about the Recognition of Israel section, whereas the previous RFC was just about the acceptance of borders in the lead of the article. While of course the two should line up, I don't think any of the options here contradict the lead - the current version of the lead says While initially seeking a state in all of former Mandatory Palestine it began acquiescing to 1967 borders in the agreements it signed with Fatah in 2005, 2006 and 2007. In 2017, Hamas released a new charter that supported a Palestinian state within the 1967 borders without recognizing Israel. I would think that recognizing borders and accepting Israel are the same thing, but that second sentence is well-cited, so apparently not and Hamas itself draws a distinction between these two things, which means the outcome of the previous RFC doesn't tell us anything about how to handle the recognition section in the body. Perhaps we could have a sentence in this section that mirrors the one in the lead, though, with a bit more detail on the distinction between accepting borders and recognizing Israel (though some of the quotes seem to tacitly touch on it.) --Aquillion (talk) 19:40, 11 November 2024 (UTC)

• Comment on clarifying that sentence in the lede emerging from the previous RFC: from a different ongoing discussion, in that sentence in the current lead "acquiescing" seems too strong, as per the artful sidestepping VR quotes below. Also the phrase "in agreements signed with Fatah in 2005, 2006, and 2007" seems a direct quote from Seurat but it is confusing – only the 2006 prisoner's document mentions borders, and it was more than an agreement signed with Fatah. What were the other agreements? They are not mentioned in the body, nor is any trend during 2005-07 mentioned in that way in the body. – SJ + 22:07, 12 November 2024 (UTC)

Q2: Kear's opinions

"According to Martin Kear, Israel treats "any form of resistance from Palestinians as acts of terrorism", and therefore responds to any resistance with extraordinary force. In contrast, writes Kear, Hamas operationalizes "...its resistance to Israeli occupation through its invocation of jihad ... Accordingly, Hamas refuses to recognise Israel as a legitimate actor..."[148]" The above statement, in its entirety appears to be irrelevant to discussion of whether Hamas recognizes Israel. "recognise Israel as a legitimate actor" is not related to diplomatic recognition of whether Israel has a claim to pre-1967 territories. Not all instances of the word "recognise" mean the same thing, and its clear from the context here that its not talking about diplomatic recognition. But the following does appear to be relevant:

"However, Kear goes on to note that without expressly stating it Hamas agreed to respect the Oslo Accords, and by extension Israel's existence: "The signing of the 2007 Mecca Agreement also meant that Hamas had met two of the three stipulations set down by Israel and the Quartet: recognising Israel and respecting all previous Israeli-Palestinian agreements."" However, it is slightly misleading. Earlier in the paragraph, Kear does indeed say Hamas had "artfully sidestepped the ideological black hole tied to any explicit recognition of Israel's right to exist. Hamas's leadership demonstrated a willingness and ability to push through this key ideological concession to remain an integral player in the Palestinians politics."

So it seems Kear is saying, correctly, that Hamas implicitly recognized Israel by agreeing to a Palestinian state on only WB and GS, but refrained from giving any explicit recognition of Israel. This should be made clear.VR _{(Please ping on reply)} 05:48, 10 November 2024 (UTC)

I would rephrase it as this. "Martin Kear points out that in the 2007 Mecca agreement, Hamas agreed to respect PLO's previous agreements with Israel, including the Oslo Accords that Hamas had previously criticized. After the Mecca Agreement, Hamas leader Khaled Meshaal said any future agreement with Israel must establish a Palestinian state along the 1967 borders, with East Jerusalem as its capital, and an acknowledgement of the Palestinian right of return. Kear interprets this statement as Hamas further implicitly recognizing Israel, while withholding explicit recognition." VR _{(Please ping on reply)} 06:23, 10 November 2024 (UTC)

That Hamas "implicitly recognised" Israel is a viewpoint shared by some (though by no means all) observers and it's already mentioned in the first paragraph of the section, so there is no need to repeat that.

The reader may wonder having read that why Hamas is not ready to explicitly recognise Israel, and Kear provides the explanation: the religious framing of the conflict. This is not found elsewhere is the article and clearly notable. Alaexis_¿question? 21:44, 10 November 2024 (UTC)

No, Kear says Hamas' not giving explicit recognition of Israel has more to do with it withholding recognition as a bargaining chip. This is, incidentally, Baconi's position as well. The part about "recognise Israel as a legitimate actor" isn't about diplomatic recognition. The word "recognise" is a polyseme.VR _{(Please ping on reply)} 06:49, 11 November 2024 (UTC)

I'm not opposed to mentioning the "recognition as a bargaining chip" perspective in the section again. That shouldn't be controversial, we don't need an RfC for that.

As to the semantics of the word recognition, the section doesn't only deal with the diplomatic recognition narrowly defined. Alaexis_¿question? 22:28, 12 November 2024 (UTC)

Kear’s research, according to his profile blurbs on various platforms, is focused on a specific analytical framework and may not be applicable outside said framework. Anyway, I am not sure there is not a WP:DUE problem. RadioactiveBoulevardier (talk) 05:46, 13 November 2024 (UTC)

Q1: Hypothetical recognition

The sentence Whether Hamas would recognize Israel is debated should not be the first sentence of this section. We should start with facts rather with WP:CRYSTALBALL speculations. It's like starting the article about the Golan Heights "Whether Israel would return the Golan Heights to Syria is debated" [8].

The "debate" framing is not supported by the sources. The USIP source actually states that "Hamas might never 'recognize' Israel in the conventional sense" - this is not evidence of debate, but rather the opposite [9]. The Haaretz article refers to a single statement by Abu Marzouk suggesting possible recognition, which was directly contradicted by Abu Marzouk himself just one week prior when he explicitly rejected recognition of Israel [10] The overwhelming preponderance of statements from Hamas leadership consistently reject recognition.

This creates a WP:FALSEBALANCE issue - we're presenting a single outlier statement as equal to the organization's consistent official position. Khaled Hroub's analysis of conditions under which Hamas might theoretically recognize Israel can be included later in the section but it should not be presented as the leading framing. Alaexis_¿question? 21:59, 10 November 2024 (UTC)

I think the sentence could definitely be tweaked to provide more context, but it's not WP:CRYSTALBALL - that policy is that we're not supposed to speculate about the future ourselves. Predictions by experts about what Hamas might do or accept in the future, on the other hand, are highly relevant to this article and ought to be covered. We could find more sources for it, but I do think that it's sort of the entire purpose of the section; the article is already clear that Hamas doesn't recognize Israel currently (that's implied by the first sentence of the section) and sources indicating that it doesn't do so don't contradict people talking about the future. Nor is a source saying Hamas might never 'recognize' Israel in the conventional sense, emphasis mine, really in contradiction with it - that describes the possibility as something debatable, which is what our article says! --Aquillion (talk) 19:47, 11 November 2024 (UTC)

Well, the question is why we should center the hypothetical future recognition rather than the current and historical reality. I'm not opposed to mentioning it somewhere in this section btw. Also, there are major issues with sourcing for this statement. Alaexis_¿question? 21:27, 11 November 2024 (UTC)

Q3: inclusion of Usher's opinion

Usher wrote it in 2006 before the takeover of Gaza by Hamas, several small-scale conflicts between Hamas and Israel, the 2017 document and the current war. There are many sources published in the last 5-10 years that deal with the policy of Hamas. We don't need it in this section, we should rather move the sentence to the Hamas#Evolution of positions section. Alaexis_¿question? 21:59, 10 November 2024 (UTC)

Why can't it be in both places? It's clearly relevant to Hamas' recognition of Israel.VR _{(Please ping on reply)} 06:46, 11 November 2024 (UTC)

For the same reason why we can't say in present tense that Israel offers East Jerusalem to the Palestinians because they did it in 2008. Lots of things have happened since then, including Hamas rejecting the two-state solution. Also, dozens of books and scholarly articles have been published more recently and we should use those when talking about the current situation. Alaexis_¿question? 21:34, 11 November 2024 (UTC)

The first link is from 2019 and seems like a typo, and the second link quotes Meshal after he was no longer the leader of Hamas. We wouldn't say "the United States considers Israel to be an apartheid state" based on the writings of an ex-president. You're most welcome to quote recent sources, but you don't seem to have done that.VR _{(Please ping on reply)} 05:49, 12 November 2024 (UTC)

Thanks, I've fixed the typo. Haniye, the head of Hamas, said in 2020 that one of the principles of Hamas is 'Palestine from the sea to the river' around 11:40. Maybe in your opinion this is consistent with "accepting Israel as a political reality" but many scholars disagree with that.

I'm happy to include those references, but lets clarify them first.

• Nasir Faeq on page 33 quotes (Hroub 2000) and "guidelines [that] are summarized in a statement by the Political Bureau of Hamas dated April 1994" as saying Hamas wouldn't recognize Israel. There appear to be no references later than 2000 that Faeq quotes in which Hamas rejects recognition, correct?
• Alsoos quotes Hamas's 1988 Charter as rejecting Israel's recognition (page 6 and 7) before noting that "However, after its electoral victory in 2006, Hamas did not implement the Charter as policy, but instead agreed to work within the Palestinian political system based on secular Basic Law." It also quotes Haniyeh saying "Hamas will not recognize the Zionist entity" in 2003. Again, there appear to be no references later than 2003 of Hamas rejecting recognition, correct?

So there don't appear to be any contradiction here. It seems Hamas was adamant about not recognizing Israel prior to 2005-ish, when it starting signing agreements that accepted the 1967 borders.VR _{(Please ping on reply)} 03:55, 13 November 2024 (UTC)

References

Proposals

1

I'm going to propose different wording options, please give me feedback and I'll amend my proposal accordingly.

Hamas's leaders have emphasized they don't recognize Israel. But, Hamas has also repeatedly accepted the 1967 borders (such as the 2006 Prisoners' document and the 2007 Mecca agreement), thus acknowledging the existence of another entity on the other side. Whether Hamas would recognize Israel in a future peace agreement is debated.

Mousa Abu Marzook, then the vice-president of Hamas' Political Bureau, explained his party's position in 2011: while Hamas did not recognize Israel as a state, it considered the existence of Israel as "amr waqi" (or fait accompli, meaning something that has happened and cannot be changed). He called this "de facto recognition" of Israel. Likewise, Graham Usher writes that while Hamas does not consider Israel to be legitimate, it has accepted Israel as political reality.

In 2017, Hamas once again accepted the 1967 borders in its new charter, that "drop[ped] the call for the destruction of Israel from its manifesto." But it did not abrogate the old charter, and other scholars believe that Hamas retains the long-term objective of establishing one state in former Mandatory Palestine.

Tareq Baconi explains that Hamas' implicit recognition of Israel is in contrast to most Israeli political parties who have long opposed the idea of a Palestinian state.

VR _{(Please ping on reply)} 07:03, 12 November 2024 (UTC)

Looks pretty good to me. TarnishedPath^talk 07:29, 12 November 2024 (UTC)

This is a bit better but still has NPOV issues. I'd suggest waiting until we get external feedback via the RfC, otherwise it can lead to confusion. Alaexis_¿question? 22:45, 12 November 2024 (UTC)

I also support this version. It would have been better to have gotten to this right away instead of having a convoluted RfC with 9 options. Raskolnikov.Rev (talk) 13:15, 13 November 2024 (UTC)

+1 on supporting this version (as mentioned in the survey) Smallangryplanet (talk) 13:24, 13 November 2024 (UTC)

2

Hamas leaders have repeatedly emphasized they do not recognize Israel. But Hamas has also repeatedly accepted the 1967 borders in signed agreements (in 2005, 2006, and 2007) and in its 2017 charter, thus acknowledging the existence of another entity on the other side. Whether Hamas would recognize Israel in a future peace agreement is debated. Several scholars have compared Hamas's lack of recognition of Israel to Likud's lack of recognition of a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza.

The 1988 Hamas charter strongly rejected any recognition of Israel. In 1994, the Political Bureau of Hamas repeated this rejection. However, after Hamas won the 2006 elections, it did not implement then 1988 Charter as policy, and instead agreed to work with the existing Palestinian political system. In the 2007 Mecca agreement, Hamas agreed to respect previous agreements between Fatah and Israel, including the Oslo Accords in which the PLO recognized Israel. Both in the 2007 agreement and in the 2006 Palestinian Prisoners' Document, Hamas agreed to a Palestinian state based on the 1967 borders. Scholars see this as "implicit" recognition of Israel because by accepting a Palestinian state limited to the 1967 borders, Hamas acknowledged the existence of another entity on the other side.

Mousa Abu Marzook, then the vice-president of Hamas' Political Bureau, explained his party's position in 2011: while Hamas did not recognize Israel as a state, it considered the existence of Israel as "amr waqi" (or fait accompli, meaning something that has happened and cannot be changed). He called this "de facto recognition" of Israel. Likewise, Graham Usher writes that while Hamas does not consider Israel to be legitimate, it has accepted Israel as political reality.

In 2017, Hamas once again accepted the 1967 borders in its new charter, that "drop[ped] the call for the destruction of Israel from its manifesto." But it did not abrogate the old charter, and other scholars believe that Hamas retains the long-term objective of establishing one state in former Mandatory Palestine.

Tareq Baconi argues that Hamas has learned from the fact that, in the 1993 Oslo Accords, the PLO made a "historic concession" in recognizing Israel on 78% of the land of historic Palestine (along the 1967 borders), but was unable to convince Israel to recognize Palestine on the remaining 22% of the land. Having already recognized Israel, the PLO was unable to use recognition to extract any further concessions from Israel. Thus, Baconi opines, the lesson for Hamas was that you can't negotiate from a position of weakness.

• Here is a new version with some of the sources Alaexis mentioned incorporated. Thoughts? (Raskolnikov.Rev—TarnishedPath—Alaexis—Smallangryplanet).VR _{(Please ping on reply)} 21:45, 13 November 2024 (UTC)

Thanks, I believe that this version is even better but it can be improved, mainly to comply with WP:DUE. I'll respond in greater detail later.

I couldn't find anything about the recognition on page 206 of Brenner's Gaza Under Hamas: From Islamic Democracy to Islamist Governance. Could you re-check and provide a quote that supports this passage? Alaexis_¿question? 05:45, 14 November 2024 (UTC)

@Alaexis are you looking at a different edition? Here it is on the google books copy: Of equal key importance was Hamas's revised position on the establishment of a Palestinian state. The new document still referred to Palestine as the territory 'from the river to the sea. However, it also added that it accepted the pre-1967 lines as the borders of a Palestinian state, with Jerusalem as its capital and the right of return for refugees. While not explicitly saying what would be on the other side of these borders, this nevertheless acknowledged the existence of another entity there. In addition, Hamas expressed that it would be ready to back 'any peace agreement', would it be approved in a popular referendum. These new formulations amounted to nothing less than a de facto recognition of Israel. During its deliberations, the movement had reached an internal agreement on accepting a two-state solution. (Brenner, p.206) Smallangryplanet (talk) 10:13, 14 November 2024 (UTC)

That's weird, I'm looking at the 2017 edition and I can't find this text anywhere in the book. The google books link unfortunately doesn't work for me, it says "no preview available." Google Books says that the book was published in 2016, I dunno, maybe there were different editions indeed.

I'm sure that this text is legitimate, hopefully we'll find the reason for all this confusion.

Btw, which document does Brenner talk about in the excerpt that you quoted? Alaexis_¿question? 20:29, 14 November 2024 (UTC)

@Smallangryplanet Alaexis_¿question? 20:36, 15 November 2024 (UTC)

This is good, but flagging two things: The "Faeq, Nasir; Jahnata, Diego (2020-09-12)" source appears to be published by a pay to play publishing mill so fails WP:REPUTABLE. The authors are also nowhere to be found as working scholars (at least I haven't been able to), and the piece itself is as expected riddled with basic grammatical errors.

Also I think we need an explanation for the de facto acceptance of Israel as a reality and the lack of a formal, official recognition. Baconi is cited but I don't think it covers exactly the three specific points he makes in this regard on the cited page, 230:

"While Hamas may indeed continue to harbor ideological aspirations for the liberation of the entirety of Palestine after such a peaceful settlement, the likelihood that the movement would have popular backing for such a step is likely to be nonexistent if a just settlement is offered. Khaled Meshal has even offered written guarantees to international mediators underscoring this, noting that Hamas would abide by the outcome of any referendum to a peace deal delivered to the Palestinian people, including deals that entail mutual recognition, while stressing that Hamas would not accept those outcomes until the deal is implemented.97

It is more likely the case that Hamas is simply maintaining this ideological intransigence as a negotiating tactic and a matter of principle, tying into the movement’s legitimacy and its effectiveness as an interlocutor. 98 The movement believes that conceding the remaining cards that Hamas still clings to would ensure that Palestinian rights continued to be forfeited, as had happened following the PLO’s recognition of Israel. As one leader explained, “Why should we be forced to explicitly recognize Israel if we’ve already indicated we have a de facto acceptance of its presence?”99

Hamas’s implicit acceptance of Israel has gone far beyond what many Israeli political parties, including the dominant ruling Likud party, have offered Palestinians within their charters. With their refusal to recognize the right of Palestinian self-determination, their insistence that the Palestinian people never existed, and the intermittent resurfacing of the “Jordan option,” several Israeli political parties have long opposed the notion of a Palestinian state.100 In 2013, Prime Minister Netanyahu publicly reneged on his highly touted 2009 Bar Ilan speech in which he spoke of the possibility of a demilitarized Palestinian state.101"

So we have Baconi saying Hamas leaders offered written guarantees to accept any peace deal, including formal recognition, if certified by referendum (it's not only Meshal, but others have reiterated this too at later points) 2) That they are holding on to not extending formal recognition as both a negotiating tactic against the Israelis who have not offered the same in return and they see conceding this as the PLO did as forfeiting their rights, and then the de facto point is made again but that's superfluous here, already noted in the section. 3) It points to many Israeli political parties including the ruling dominant Likud not extending the same acceptance to Palestinians within their charters.

Could this be incorporated in the Baconi paragraph in a trimmed form summarizing these points? Raskolnikov.Rev (talk) 15:18, 14 November 2024 (UTC)

auto archiving delay

Talk page seems to get extremely long (206,066 bytes), which may be a good sign for our desire to discuss, but may also be unconveniently long. In the past (June24) the auto archiving delay has been shorter (21 days or shorter). Today the delay is 25 days. Although it may not quickly help very much for shortening the talk page, I now reduce the delay down to 20 days; it might perhaps even be useful to reduce that delay a bit further. Corriebertus (talk) 10:11, 15 November 2024 (UTC)

Extended-confirmed-protected edit request on 15 November 2024

change to Jeufleuleu (talk) 15:47, 15 November 2024 (UTC)